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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this study is to understand the diffusion of Corporate Governance (CG) 
regulations and practices around the world in general and in developing countries in particular. 
More specifically this paper poses some simple but important empirical questions; what types of 
CG codes have emerged around the world? What causes the diffusion of shareholder centric 
model of CG around the world? In addition this study also highlights the limitations of current 
research analyzed CG emergence and development around the world. This discussion will lead 
to the identification of research gaps that this study aims to fill. 
 
2. Emergence of CG Regulations Around the World 
The diffusion of CG regulations around the world is noticeable. Today codes of corporate 
governance have emerged all around the world (Enrione et al., 2006, Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). The emergence and development of codes 
of corporate governance did not follow a linear path (Table 1).The first code of corporate 
governance was issued in the USA in 1978, followed by Hong Kong in 1989, Ireland in 1991, 
and the United Kingdom in 1992. The issuance of the first four codes occurred over a period of 
fourteen years, however, there was an exponential rise in the diffusion rate since the issuance of 
the Cadbury Report in the UK in 1992 (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, Enrione et al., 
2006). Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009)reviewed the diffusion of CG regulations around the 
world and found that by the middle of 2008, 64 countries had issued 196 different codes of 
corporate governance. Some countries have had more than one code; the most notable are the 
UK and the USA with 25 codes each. South Africa was the first developing country and Sweden 
was the first civil law country to introduce codes in 1994. In Pakistan, the first code of corporate 
governance was issued in 2002 with a revised version in 2012. 
 
The development of CG codes around the world is evident; however analysis of what type of CG 
codes introduced and why CG regulations diffused around the world is difficult.  Every country 
exhibits different legal, economic, social, cultural, and political systems, which determine the 
system of CG residing in that country. Solomon (2010, p 181),argued that “there are as many 
corporate governance systems as there are countries”. Prior studies argued that definition of CG, 
model of CG and types of code issuer impact the diffusion of CG around the world.  
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1992 UK           
1993            
1994 Canada South Africa          
1995 Australia France          
1996 Spain           
1997 Japan The 
Netherlands 
USA         
1998 Belgium Germany India Italy Thailand       
1999 Brazil Greece Hong Kong Ireland Mexico Portugal South Korea OECD ICGN Commonwealth  
2000 Denmark Indonesia Kenya Malaysia Romania The Philippines      
2001 China Czech Republic Malta Peru Singapore Sweden Uganda     
2002 Austria Cyprus Hungary Oman Pakistan Poland Russia Slovakia Switzerland Taiwan  
2003 Finland Lithuania Macedonia New Zealand Turkey Ukraine Latin America     
2004 Argentina Bangladesh Iceland Norway Mauritius Slovenia OECD     
2005 Latvia Jamaica ICGN         
2006 Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
Egypt Estonia Israel Lebanon Luxemburg Nigeria Saudi Arabia Sri Lanka Trinidad and 
Tobago 
UN 
2007 Bulgaria Colombia Jordan Kazakhstan Moldova Mongolia U.A.E     
2008 Albania Morocco Qatar Serbia Tunisia       
2009 Algeria Croatia Georgia Montenegro        
2010 Armenia Bahrain Baltic States Ghana Malawi Yemen      
2011 Azerbaijan Guernsey          
2012 Republic of 
Maldives 
          
2013 Barbados           
Table 1: Diffusion of CG regulations around the world (Source: European Corporate Governance Institute) 
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1.1. Corporate governance: definitions and interpretations 
Corporate governance is an eclectic subject with no single accepted definition. The way theorists, policy 
makers, practitioners and researchers define GC is important in order to understand the nature of and 
reasons for CG reforms around the world. Corporate governance can be defined from a narrow financial 
perspective i.e. shareholder perspective or in broader terms considering corporations are accountable to 
a wide range of stakeholders as well as society.  
1.1.1. Shareholder Perspective 
Financial economists have argued that the primary goal of the firm is to maximize shareholder wealth 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This perspective of CG has emerged from the classic work of Berle and 
Means (1932). According to these authors, during the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, shareholding 
became dispersed due to the separation between ownership and control, i.e. many US firms were 
controlled by the managers but owned by the weak minority shareholders. In such situations, 
shareholders may want to maximize profit, but on the other hand, managers may want to pursue self-
interest. The prior literature on CG has paid significant attention to the agency problems where 
companies were required to run in the best interests of the shareholders (Davis, 2009, Brennan and 
Solomon, 2008). From this perspective, renowned economists Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p737) defined 
CG as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment.” Similarly, in terms of shareholder-centric approach, Parkinson(1993,p. 159) defines 
corporate governance as  
[. . .] the process of supervision and control [. . .] intended to ensure that the 
company’s management acts in accordance with the interests of shareholders.  
This shareholder-centric perspective prioritizes shareholder rights over all other stakeholders. Thus, 
companies‟ main objective should be to maximize shareholder‟s wealth. In the beginning, this ideology 
gained dominance is the US and other stock market-based economies (Yoshikawa et al., 2007).Jensen 
and Meckling(1976)extended agency theory to those problems rooted in separation of ownership from 
control in the modern form of corporations. Agency theory, which emerged from the seminal work of 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) is concerned with contractual problems 
that can arise in any cooperative exchange.  Agency theory contends due to self interested nature of 
human contract tend be incomplete and are subject o moral hazards. The information asymmetry makes 
it costly for principals (shareholders) to know what agents (managers) actually accomplished (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Thus from the agency theory point of view, CG is the mechanism available to minimize 
notorious agency problems arising due to the separation of ownership and control.  
 
1.1.2. Stakeholders Perspective  
 
The critics of agency theory contend that firms have broad responsibilities and cannot be restricted to 
dyadic relationships between firms and shareholders but also to other stakeholders (Blair and Stout, 
1999). From the stakeholder‟s perspective, corporate governance is seen as a web of relationships 
between not only a company and its shareholders, but rather between a company and its broad range of 
other stakeholders including employees, customers, suppliers, government, bondholders, and so on 
(Mahadeo and Soobaroyen, 2013). Tricker (1984)defined corporate governance as:  
“…the governance role is not concerned with the running of the business of the company per 
se, but with giving overall direction to the enterprise, with overseeing and controlling the 
executive actions of management and with satisfying legitimate expectations of 
accountability and regulation by interests beyond the corporate boundaries.” 
The basis for the stakeholder concept of corporate governance is that impact of large size companies on 
societies are so pervasive that they should be considered accountable to the whole society, future society 
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and the natural world (Solomon, 2007). She defined CG as: 
“… the system of checks and balances, both internal, and external to companies, which 
ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a 
socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity (p.14).” 
 
1.1.3. Institutional Perspective  
 
From this social-oriented perspective, organizations require more than financial resources to survive and 
thrive in their social structure (Scott, 2000). Acceptance of organizations actions by various constituents 
in their environment is crucial for their survival. Institutional theory examined organization‟s interaction 
with the institutional environment and the effects and incorporation of social 
expectationsinorganizational practices and characteristics (Martinez and Dacin, 1999, Scott, 2001, 
Baxter and Chua, 2003). Institutions provide guidelines and resources for acting as well as imposing 
constraints on behavior by defining legal, moral, and cultural boundaries of legitimate activities. The 
institutional theory provides a legitimacy perspective that firms exposed to different institutional 
environments are pressured to adopt practices for symbolic reasons.  
The way CG governance is defined and interpreted is crucial as countries often follow either a 
shareholder (outsider-dominated) centric or insider dominated model while developing their corporate 
governance regulations. Moreover, researchers used these expectations as criteria to examine corporate 
governance regulations and practices prevailing in specific contexts (Deephouse and Heugens, 2009). 
Institutional theory perspective is mostly used in identifying possible caused of CG codes diffusion 
around the world.  
2.1. Models of Corporate Governance 
Although any effort to categorize CG systems is very difficult, the most common and generally accepted 
means is pattern of ownership, i.e. an/the insider/outsider model. The outsider-dominated system refers 
to publicly listed firms where the manager controlled the firms but the firms were owned by large 
number of outside shareholders. This situation resulted in a separation between ownership and control 
and the purpose of CG is to resolve the agency problem described earlier in this chapter. This type of 
system is also termed as a market-based system and is frequently referred to as an Anglo-American or 
Anglo-Saxon model due to the influence of the UK and US stock markets on other markets around the 
world (Solomon, 2007).  
The insider-dominated system of CG refers to where few major shareholders owned and controlled 
publicly listed companies. This type of system is also termed as a relationship-based system and is 
commonly available in, but not limited to, Germany, Japan and South Asia with different variants 
(Solomon, 2007, Claessens et al., 2000, La Porta et al., 1999, Millar et al., 2005). The main purpose of 
CG codes in insider-dominated systems is to resolve conflict between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008). The understanding of CG models is important to analyze 
what types of CG codes are emerging. This study will present that either CG codes are converging 
toward outsider-dominated CG models or towards insider-dominated one.. 
2.2. Issuers of CG Codes 
Both global and national players have issued and promoted CG regulations. Prior literature has 
recognized different types of code issuers ranging from transnational institutions to national level code 
issuers. Transnational institutions role is very encouraging and they have designed general codes (see 
table 2) to improve CG around the world (see table 2). Transnational institutions started issuing code in 
1995. The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) website is repository of all recent codes 
of corporate governance. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
developed their most influential transnational CG codes in 1999 (Roberts, 2004). The World Bank used 
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OECD CG codes as an evaluative criteria in examining CG practices in developing countries (Aguilera 
and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, Coombes and Watson, 2001). The national institutions designed and issued 
CG codes to improve corporate governance of a home country. These national institutions can include 
stock exchanges, governments, directors associations, managers associations, professional associations 
and investor associations (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, Enrione et al., 2006).  It is important to 
understand codes issuers in the different institutional contexts to identifying actors, source of 
innovationand how strongly they are enforced (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  
Table-2: Codes of Corporate Governance by Transnational Institutions 
Commonwealth 
o    issues CACG Guidelines for commonwealth countries in November 1999 
International 
o    CG practices in Microfinance Institutions issues in 2012  
o    Sovereign Wealth Funds (GAPP) - Santiago Principles October 2008  
o    CG for Islamic Financial Services - December 2006  
o    ICGN -  July 2005  
 
 
Latin America 
o    Latin American CG - 2003 
OECD 
o    OECD Guidelines on CGfor State-Owned Enterprises - September 2005 
o    OECD Principles of CG 22 April 2004 and May 1999 
 
Pan-Europe 
o    EVCA CG Guidelines - June 2005 
 o    Corporate Governance in Europe June 1995 
United Nations 
o    Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure 2006  
(Source: European Institute of Corporate Governance) 
 
This section highlights that codes of CG are rapidly diffused around the globe. Both transnational and 
national players have issued and promoted CG regulations around the world. The following section will 
provides discussion on what types of CG codes have emerged around the world? Are these have some 
similarities? Why countries have introduced CG codes?  
2. CG reforms worldwide – what and why 
2.1. Nature of CG reforms – convergence vs. divergence 
What type of CG model a country has adopted is one of the key areas of concern for prior CG research 
at the country level. In doing so, most of these studies have focused on convergence and divergence of 
the CG model that a country has adopted which ultimately leads towards the Anglo-American model 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, Yoshikawa et al., 2007, Collier and Zaman, 2005, Siddiqui, 2010, 
Mukherjee-Reed, 2002, Reed, 2002). The majority of these governance researches showed that 
governance regulations at the country level are gradually becoming more similar and are converging 
towards the internationally accepted outsider-dominated (Anglo-American) model (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2001, Reed, 2002, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, Witt, 2004, Siddiqui, 2010). 
Corporate governance policy documents and codes of best practices around the globe [for example, The 
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Cadbury Report (1992), The Greenbury Report (1995), The Combined Code (1998), Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SOX) (2002), The Higgs Report (2003), and The Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2003, 
2006)], all approached corporate governance reforms from the perspective of protecting and enhancing 
the wealth of shareholders. The Cadbury Report (1992, p14) defined corporate governance as “the 
system by which organizations are directed and controlled”. The Cadbury report suggested that the 
board of directors is responsible for the governance of the company and is answerable to shareholders. 
 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra(2004)analyzed the adoption of CG codes in 49 countries and revealed that 
there is a convergence trend towards the Anglo-American model. They argued that most of the codes 
were designed to protect shareholder rights. Similarly, Zattoni and Cuomo (2008) noted  in their 
comparative study that all codes were meant to secure shareholder rights and required companies to 
adopt CG mechanism available in the Anglo-American model. Roberts (2004) identified that Russian 
codes of corporate governance are an attempt to impose the Anglo-American model on Russian 
businesses by emphasizing the importance of shareholder protection. Siddiqui (2010)presented data that 
showed that the CG model adopted by Bangladesh suggested listed companies to have a single-tier 
board structure where shareholders elect directors, the inclusion of an independent director, and 
separation of the chairman and CEO, etc. These guidelines are consistent with the OECD guidelines for 
CG. Similarly, the Anglo-American nature of reforms has been observed in other countries as well, for 
example in India (Reed, 2002), South Africa (West, 2006) and Japan (Yoshikawa et al., 2007). In sum, 
many countries not only introduced codes of CG and these codes are in-line with shareholder centric 
model. In following section, this study will discuss why most of the countries introduced codes of CG 
in-line with Anglo-American models.  
2.2. Reasons for reforms – efficiency vs. legitimacy 
There is another side of the debate that highlights why similar CG reforms particularly those that are in 
line with the Anglo-American model, are diffusing across the countries. This debate mostly oscillates 
between efficiency vs. legitimacy reasons that trigger countries to issue codes of good governance. This 
study used institutional theory lens to analyze the possible root causes of similarities amongst the CG 
codes around the world.  
 
The efficiency perspective assumes that the adoption of shareholder centric CG model will improve 
economic outlook of the country. The advocates of the shareholder-centric model argue dispersed 
ownership from managerial control is more modern and efficient than family firms, and bank-led groups 
(see, for example, Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, Mueller, 2006). The promoters of the agency theory 
perspective assume a link or causality between law, finance, and economic growth (La Porta et al., 1997, 
La Porta et al., 1998, Mueller, 2006). Firms securing shareholder interestprovides attractive locations for 
local companies and (World Bank, 2000) foreign investors to invest, thus promoting economic growth 
(Mueller, 2006). They argued that companies throughout the world should observe shareholder rights, 
maximize shareholder value, and be transparent in their reporting of corporate activities. (Mueller, 
2006)argued that the best development strategy for developing countries is to create conditions that 
produce a large equity market. He argued that there is a positive relationship between the strength of a 
country‟s corporate governance institutions and the size of its equity market, and that large equity 
markets foster faster economic growth. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997)argued that strong investment 
protection is necessary to persuade investors to invest in the companies otherwise weak shareholder 
protection is associated with a weak capital market. The proponents of the shareholder-centric model 
also argued that companies are no longer relying on domestic financial resources and hence, are 
attempting to attract foreign investments. Corporate governance is one of the ways to increase investors‟ 
confidence in countries‟ financial markets and entice them to take a risk (Solomon, 2007). Other studies 
also promote corporate governance reforms in favor of shareholders around the world (Ananchotikul 
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and Eichengreen, 2009, Daily et al., 2003, Klapper and Love, 2004). Thus, from the efficiency 
perspective, in an effort to increase a country‟s economic growth and to attract local and foreign 
investments, the corporate governance system should focus on protecting the interest of shareholders. In 
doing so, many countries have introduced CG reforms toward the shareholder-centric model, i.e. the 
Anglo-American model (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, Millar et al., 2005, Mueller, 2006).   
 
Institutional theory perspective contends organizations survival depends on theirsocially accepted 
interaction with their environment (Dillard et al., 2004). In highly institutionalized environments, social 
forces act to generate similarities among organizations this is what (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) 
described as, organizations becoming isomorphic in an external institutional environment. An 
isomorphism is a “constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that 
face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p 66).  DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991)identified three kinds of isomorphic pressures – mimetic, normative, and coercive. 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when the organization mimics the actions of successful organizations to 
demonstrate that they are enhancing their legitimacy or at least trying to improve their working 
conditions. Normative isomorphism stems from professionalization where professional organizations 
collectively define working conditions to promote a cognitive basis to legitimize their practices. Both 
formal and informal Coercive isomorphism occurs when powerful organizations and cultural 
expectations from the society they function within put pressures on organization. The institutional 
perspective argues that organizations become isomorphic with an external institutional environment and 
are pressured to adopt practices that have institutional legitimacy for symbolic reasons.  
 
Prior researches have used both efficiency and legitimacy perspectives to analyze why countries are 
adopting corporate governance regulations (for example see:, Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008, Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, Reed, 2002, Enrione et al., 2006, 
Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, Siddiqui, 2010, Ananchotikul and Eichengreen, 2009, Klapper and 
Love, 2004, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, La Porta et al., 1997). Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2004)conducted one of the earliest empirical studies to examine the forces influencing adoption of 
codes of good governance around the world between 1978-1999. They argued that countries have 
developed codes in response to both efficiency and legitimacy pressures. The efficiency of the 
governance system is defined in terms of shareholders rights and legitimacy is defined in terms of the 
conformity to widespread governance practices. Zattoni and Cuomo (2008)investigated the reasons 
behind the proliferation of codes of corporate governance in 60 countries. They argued that the 
legitimization reasons are more dominant in countries with poor investor protection than efficiency 
reasons.  
 
Reed (2002)studied corporate governance reforms in developing countries and looked into the 
underlying causes of reforms. He mentioned that many developing countries introduced CG regulations 
in line with the Anglo-American model due to the legitimacy reasons. The poor economic performance 
resulted in a debt crisis in many developing countries which placed these countries under the direct 
influence of international financial bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank. These international 
financial bodies imposed a series of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and these programmes 
increased attention towards governance issues. He identified that countries adopted a shareholder-centric 
model of CG due to three reasons. First, these reforms are important to promote efficiency amongst 
domestic firms and will enable them to compete against international firms that are entering into 
previously no-go domestic markets. Second, these reforms are important to boost the confidence of 
international investors by eliminating traditional cheap credit through government development banks. 
Lastly, these reforms protectgovernmentsfromunpopular liberalizing reforms (e.g. cutting back on 
spending) by highlighting to public that effective corporate structure is crucial for growth and 
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development. The study states that developing economies tend to adopt the Anglo-American model of 
CG despite that such a model is based on assumptions of efficient markets and equity financing.  
Siddiqui (2010) found similar adoption reasons in Bangladesh and argued that the adoption of CG codes 
was not on efficiency grounds but rather on pressure from International Financial Agencies (IFAs) to 
which Bangladesh is highly relying on for monetary aid.  
In addition to efficiency vs. Legitimacy reasons of CG codes transnational institutions have played 
crucial role in the diffusion of corporate governance reforms around the world (Roberts, 2004, Arnold, 
2005, Arnold, 2012). Pressure from international institutions resulted in cross-border isomorphism of 
common organizational practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The World Bank forced developing and 
transition economies to upgrade their practices to the international level. IMF, the World Bank has 
issued CG country assessment reports for 44 countries. This report used OECD principles to evaluate the 
state of CG practices. The corporate governance reforms suggested by international financial agencies as 
a pre-requisite for obtaining loans in developing countries serve as a coercive isomorphic pressure. 
Although the two perspectives (efficiency vs. legitimacy) provide a useful way to analyze the diffusion 
of CG reforms around the world, however, this study argues that these two lenses are insufficient in 
explaining reforms and practices around the globe in a multifaceted context. The next section follows 
this debate.   
 
3. Diffusion of CG regulations: theoretical and empirical limitations 
This study argues that pure economic view of agency theory and legitimacy view of institutional theory 
alone or together are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of how CG codes are emerged and 
developed in different contexts. These studies have provided some valuable insight into the diffusion of 
CG reforms; however such work is not without its limitations.  
The existing studies of diffusion of CG regulations around the world, particularly in emerging 
economies, usually focused on similarities between adopted codes and internationally accepted CG 
practices. These studies considered that isomorphism does not affect the substance of the codes. These 
studies emphasized similarities of CG regulations in developing countries with the Anglo-American 
model of CG (e.g. Siddiqui, 2010) while the differences were down-played. According to Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra(2009), prior studies assume that codes are equivalent across countries and can be 
analyzedusingone common variable or as a comparable independent variable. Although most of the 
codes diffused around the world shared common principles, codes vary significantly because they were 
introduced to resolve corporate governance issues specific to a given country. Studies arguing that the 
adoption of CG regulations is the outcome of mimetic, normative, or coercive response to institutional 
pressures fail to capture the political bargaining process that takes place in determining the contents of 
the adopted regulations.  
 
The agency theory perspective reduces social relationships between firms to simple dyad relationships 
between economically rational and self-motivated agents (Lubatkin, 2007). Sociologists and legal 
scholars have criticized the supremacy of shareholders and recognized it is a more political and 
normative efforts from broad coalition of players with common interests (Blair and Stout, 1999, Deakin 
and Konzelmann, 2004, Arnold, 2005, Arnold, 2012, Davis, 2009).  Deakin and Konzelmann 
(2004)pointed out that even US corporate law does not regard shareholders as undisputed owners of the 
firm. This reductionist approach may be intended to reduce the complexity of the governance 
phenomenon, but it engenders the under socialized and acultural view of firms, thereby reducing the 
model‟s relevance (Lubatkin et al., 2007) in different contexts. 
 
The inherent problem in the shareholder-centric approach is its assumption that ownership structure in 
large corporations is dispersed across many small shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999) showed that 
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outside the US and the UK, dispersion of ownership is more an exception than the rule. Subsequent 
studies confirmed the findings of La Porta et al. (1999) (see for example:, Claessens et al., 2000, Attig et 
al., 2002, Becht and Roell, 1999, Faccio and Lang, 2002). The applicability of the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance outside the UK and the US, especially in Asian economies, has been 
questioned (Rwegasira, 2000, Siddiqui, 2010, Uddin and Choudhury, 2008, Özcan and Çokgezen, 2003, 
Mukherjee-Reed, 2002). In many countries, shareholding is concentrated in the hand of founding family 
members, lending banks and other companies through cross shareholdings. Young et 
al.,(2008)suggested that in developingeconomies due to concentration of ownership, major conflict is 
not between management and shareholders, but rather it is between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders and also suggested that in developing countries corporate governance should focus on 
resolving issues between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  
 
The limited focus of prior diffusion studies on the economic view of agency theory and legitimacy view 
of institutional theory is incapable of explaining the process of the emergence and development of 
corporate governance reforms in any particular country. As suggested by Hancher and Moran (1989), 
regulation cannot occur without extensive cooperation and negotiation among key actors in the 
regulatory space. The narrow conceptualization of institutional dynamics in prior research is 
fundamentally flawed because it maintained a distinction between technical forces and rational 
economic decision making on the one hand, and institutional forces and „irrationality‟ on the other. Most 
of the previous studies identified causal factors of adoption at the macro level and looks into what or 
why questions and ignores the “how” question. The dichotomy of efficiency and legitimacy reasons of 
diffusion ignores other important aspects that can influence diffusion and the process of diffusion. This 
dichotomy has focused on diffusion as an outcome rather than a process and as a result has neglected the 
influence of political, social, cultural, and legal factors and the role of power and group interests. Even 
the prior studies showed disagreement whether CG emerged and developed due to efficiency reasons or 
legitimation effects (Strang and Macy, 2001, Tolbert and Zucker, 1983, Westphal and Zajac, 1997).  
Prior institutional studies have highlighted that transnational organisations play a key role in the 
diffusion of regulations in emerging economies, and national regulators and regulatees passively adhere 
to internationally accepted regulatory practices. These institutional theorists often undermine their 
ability to respond proactively, strategically, and creatively to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991, 
DiMaggio, 1988, Scott, 2001). DiMaggio (1988) argued that there is a need to study power and actors 
who actually create and influence institutions. Countries differ in the way that power is allocated across 
organizations and actors and also how it is reflected in each nation‟s legal system and overall 
institutional framework (Roe, 2003). Influential transnational actors (e.g. the World Bank, IMF, OECD, 
Asian Development Bank, and International Finance Corporation) have not displaced the nation state, 
marginalised local actors and transformed national institutional arrangements and organisational 
routines. Rather, they rely on the support of national regulators and local organizations to confer 
legitimacy on the transnational regulations they wish to implement (Cooper et al., 1996). If regulatory 
reforms were to change status quo or have adverse effects on organizational routines, then local actors 
may form a lobby to oppose reforms. It is thus important to understand power dynamics in regulation 
development processes and the roles of national actors in the production and implementation of 
regulation in a local context. Understanding how CG regulations are diffused in a local context can help 
unveil problems and game playing to smooth future regulatory efforts (see, for example, Canning and 
O‟Dwyer, 2013, Malsch and Gendron, 2011, Caramanis, 2005, Arnold, 2005). 
 
4. Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper was to understand the diffusion of CG codes around the world. More 
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specifically this paper examined what types of CG codes have emerged around the world? What causes 
the diffusion of shareholder centric model of CG around the world? What areas are still unexplained to 
better understand the diffusion of CG?  
This paper presented that pure economics and legitimacy reasons alone or together are not sufficient to 
explain the dynamics of how corporate governance reforms emerged and developed in different 
contexts. This study assumes that researcher should pay more attention to the process of emergence and 
development of corporate governance reforms rather than reasons of reforms. Yoshikawa et al. (2007) 
conducted a multiple-case, multiple-level study using a sample of Japanese firms to understand the 
diffusion of governance innovation. They argued that the spread of innovations across institutional 
levels and firms is far from linear and straightforward. Japanese companies decoupled themselves from 
governance reforms and customized their corporate governance practices according to their particular 
local circumstances. The local companies refused the straightforward adoption of the Anglo-American 
types of reforms. Eventually, these companies forced government to revise the code of CG to 
accommodate local demands. This study revealed that the diffusion of CG in the national context is a 
complex and dynamic process, which involves the interaction among a range of actors pursing their self-
interests. Thus, national social, economic, and political contexts and roles and the power of local actors 
are important dimensions that should not be overlooked.  
Prior institutional research ignores countries‟ internal dynamics that can play an important role in 
shaping corporate governance reforms. The CG practices cannot exist in isolation as each country has its 
own unique institutional arrangements and can influence the process of diffusion. Researcher should pay 
more attention to heterogeneity than homogeneity in CG practices. Limited use of institutional theory 
requires an approach that should be able to provide robust explanations of broader institutional dynamics 
related to macro and micro institutional processes.  
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